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to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in
accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the
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1 Introduction
Competing firms often differ in terms of their degree of market accessibility.
This is typically the case in international or interregional trade, where firms
located in different countries or regions are characterized by different transport
and communication costs to reach consumers located in a specific market. This
may occur for natural reasons (e.g. geographical distance) or artificial ones
(e.g., for different endowments of transportation infrastructure, different access
to communication technologies, or trade barriers). At the theoretical level, it
is interesting to investigate firm strategic behavior when there is a trade-off for
consumers between purchasing a “nearby” lower-quality variant of the good or
a “far away” higher-quality one.1 To make our argument effective, consider
the case of typical food, e.g. Italian cheese like mozzarella or Parmesan. In
this case, “high quality” original producers in Italy compete with “low quality”
imitators outside Italy. In the United States, for instance, a consumer in New
York can choose between a low quality Parmesan produced in Wisconsin (whose
producers, indeed, hold a market leader position), or a “high quality” Parmesan
produced in Italy.2 Similar situations occur in services as well. In tourism, a
German citizen can choose between a “low quality” destination in the Baltic or
a “high quality” destination in the Mediterranean sea or outside Europe. We
intend to analyze these types of situations in which quality-differentiated firms
invest in market-accessibility enhancement in a strategic environment.
More specifically, two firms located in different regions compete for attracting
consumers located in a third region. The transport costs for the two regions are
ex-ante different, and this asymmetry is assumed to capture all the differences
in market accessibility between regions. On the production side, firms’ products
are vertically differentiated; on the demand side, consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to their quality appreciation, while the transport cost for a specific
region is identical across consumers.
First, we consider the locations and the quality levels of firms as given. Also,
we assume that the ex-ante transport cost for the region where the high-quality
good is produced is the highest. The strategic interaction in market accessi-
bility is modeled as a two-stage game. At the first stage, each firm invests in
1The opposite case, namely that of a “close” high-quality producer and a “distant” low-
quality one is, in our opinion, less interesting, because it reinforces the natural demand ad-
vantage of high- versus low-quality producers.
2“Fake Parmesan wins the US’ best cheese award”, http://www.italianfoodnet.com,
March 27, 2009.
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accessibility enhancement, i.e. in the reduction of transport cost (an alternative,
equivalent, interpretation is that the investment is made by a regional author-
ity). At the second stage, given the investment levels, firms set prices. We
first investigate how (exogenous) differences in quality levels affect investment
and thus equilibrium market shares and profitability. We show the crucial role
played by willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer
(e.g. the increase in the gross utility due to the consumption of the high-quality
good vs. the low-quality one) and the ex-ante difference in transport costs.
Then we analyze the influence of quality levels and ex-ante transport costs on
the accessibility investments. A welfare analysis is then conducted, showing that
either in the case where total profits or overall social welfare are maximized, all
the investment in accessibility enhancement should be concentrated on the high
quality region. Finally, we extend the model by endogenizing quality choice.
Our model contributes different streams of literature. Firstly, it relates to
the vast literature dealing with transport costs both in economic geography and
industrial organization. In both cases, transport costs are generally taken as ex-
ogenous, while location is a firm variable of choice (see, for example, Helpman
and Krugman (1985), Grossman (1992), Hotelling (1929), Launhardt (1993),
Thisse and Wildasin (1995), Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005)). Very few
contributions, instead, have analyzed the importance of strategic interactions
among firms in reducing the transport cost burden. Lambertini et al. (2003)
analyze the strategic effect of different intensity in profitability of transport cost
abatement on the equilibrium features in a single region. Lambertini and Rossini
(2006) extend the analysis to a two-country model focusing on the market size
role. Their analysis is further investigated in a dynamic context by Colombo
et al. (2009). With respect to the existing literature, our model simultane-
ously features vertically differentiated firms and heterogeneous consumers with
ex-ante asymmetries in transport cost.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.
In Section 3 the game is solved, with particular focus on the equilibrium in-
vestment of each firm. Section 4 provides comparative-static analysis and the
economic intuition of the results. Section 5 performs a welfare analysis under
two alternative scenarios. In Section 6 we extend the model by endogenizing
the quality levels. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 The Model
Consider two firms, and label them h and l. Firms are located in two different
regions, also labeled h and l. Firms are immobile, so notational confusion is
avoided. Each firm offers a good, whose quality is defined in the classical terms
of vertical product differentiation. Therefore the quality of the good of firms is
defined by the variables uh and ul, with uh > ul, so that firm h is the high-quality
firm and firm l is the low-quality firm. For the ease of analysis, we normalize
to zero the production cost borne by firms. Finally, the prices charged by firms
for one unit of their good are ph and pl.
Assume that, in a market external to regions h and l, a continuum of con-
sumers is distributed over the interval [0, θ¯] according to their quality appreci-
ation. Each consumer may purchase either one unit of the good or abstaining
from consumption. In addition to price, consumers bear a transport cost. Let
th be the cost borne by a consumer buying from firm h, similarly, label tl the
cost for buying from firm l.3
We define consumers’ utility a` la Mussa and Rosen (1978), so that consumer
θ ∈ [0, θ¯] enjoys a utility
U(θ, ui) =


U0 + θuh − ph − thif θ buys from h
U0 + θul − pl − tl if θ buys from l
0 if θ does not buy any good.
(1)
In (1), U0 > 0 is the utility derived from buying the good, whatever is its quality
We define uh− ul ≡ ∆u > 0 as the quality premium of firm h relative to firm l.
The standard marginal consumer approach allows to identify the consumers that
are indifferent between choosing h and l; indeed, by solving for θ the equation
θuh − ph − th = θul − pl − tl we obtain that
θh,l =
ph + th − pl + tl
∆u
. (2)
Similarly by solving θul−pl−tl = 0 we identify the consumer indifferent between
l and not buying:
θl,0 =
pl + t2 − U0
ul
. (3)
3The assumption that transport costs are borne by consumers is interchangeable with that
of transport costs borne by firms, as long as they are per unit shipped.
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From (2) and (3) the demands for firms h and l respectively are respectively:
Dh =
θ¯ − θh,l
θ¯
(4)
Dl =
θh,l − θl,0
θ¯
(5)
Notice that the demand system defined by (4) and (5) differs from that obtained
under the standard vertical differentiation assumptions by the terms th and tl,
the transport costs. Furthermore, if the term U0 in (1) is high enough (say
U0 > U¯0), θl,0 is negative, and the demand for the low-quality reduces to
Dl =
θh,l
θ¯
. (6)
In the rest of the paper we retain the simplifying assumption that U0 > U¯0.
We start by assuming that firms compete by playing a two-stage game. At
the first stage firms invest in increasing their market accessibility while at the
second stage they set prices. An alternative interpretation is that the investment
(say, a public infrastructure) is made by the corresponding regional government.
Since a single firm operates in each region, and consumer are located outside the
regions, firms and regional authorities would share the same objective function,
i.e. the firm’s profit. To solve our model we apply the standard concept of
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
3 Equilibrium
We tackle the price-setting stage first. The profit of firm i = h, l at this stage is
pii = Dipi, i = h, l. (7)
The solution to the system 

∂pih
∂ph
= 0
∂pil
∂pl
= 0
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yields the profit-maximizing prices at the first stage (second-order conditions
are satisfied). In particular they are:
pˆh(th, tl) =
1
3
(2θ¯∆u− th + tl), (8)
pˆl(th, tl) =
1
3
(θ¯∆u− th + tl). (9)
By plugging (8) and (9) back into the expression of profits we obtain
pˆih(th, tl) =
(2θ¯∆u− th + tl)
2
9θ¯∆u
, (10)
pˆil(th, tl) =
(θ¯∆u− tl + th)
2
9θ¯∆u
. (11)
We next move to the transport cost reduction stage. To proceed we need to
describe more in detail the process that allows firms to reduce the transport cost
borne by consumers. We assume that without any investment the transport cost
paid by consumers is equal to Ti > 0, i = h, l; we will refer to Ti as the ex-ante
transport cost for firm i, and to the difference Th−Tl ≡ ∆T ≥ 0 as the relative
ex-ante accessibility for firm l (region l) relative to firm h (region h).4 We assume
that the transport cost for buying from firm l is non higher than the transport
cost for buying from firm h, and an increase in the relative ex-ante accessibility
implies that, all else equal, the cost for buying from h increases with respect
to the costs from buying from l. Furthermore, we assume that the investment
required to reduce by an amount ri the transport cost requires an investment
equal to Ri(ri) = γr
2
i /2. Stated differently, by investing Ri firm i reduces the
transport cost paid by consumers to ti(ri) = Ti − ri, i = h, l. Notice that
the technology governing transport cost reduction displays decreasing returns
to scale, and that the parameter γ is an inverse measure of the efficiency of the
transport cost reduction technology. The new problem each firm faces is
max
ri
pˆii(th(rh), tl(rl))−Ri(ri), for i = h, l. (12)
Problem (12) can be solved through to the first-order condition approach. The
4This simplifying assumption can be relaxed without affecting our results by allowing ∆T
to be negative but larger than a certain value. For ∆T smaller than this threshold, demands
and prices for the low-quality firm would be negative, invalidating our analysis.
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solution to the system5


∂pˆih(.)−Rh(.)
∂rh
= 0
∂pˆil(.)−Rl(.)
∂rl
= 0
(13)
yields the optimal investment levels:
r∗h =
2[3γ(2θ¯∆u −∆T )− 2]
3γ(9θ¯γ∆u− 4)
, (14)
r∗l =
2[3γ(θ¯∆u+∆T )− 2]
3γ(9θ¯γ∆u− 4)
. (15)
It is then a matter of algebraic manipulations to obtain the expression of equi-
librium prices, demands and profits. In particular equilibrium prices are:
p∗h =
θ¯∆u[3γ(2θ¯∆u−∆T )− 2]
9γθ¯∆u − 4
, (16)
p∗l =
θ¯∆u[3γ(θ¯∆u+∆T )− 2]
9γθ¯∆u− 4
. (17)
By substituting (16) and (17) back into (4) and (6) we obtain equilibrium de-
mands for firm h and l respectively:
D∗h =
3γ(2θ¯∆u−∆T − 2)
9γθ¯∆u − 4
, (18)
D∗l =
3γ(θ¯∆u+∆T − 2)
9γθ¯∆u− 4
. (19)
To guarantee that prices and demands in (16)-(19) are positive we assume that6
∆u > max[
2 + 3γ∆T
6γθ¯
,
4
9γθ¯
]. (20)
Finally equilibrium profits are:
pi∗h =
(9γθ¯∆u− 2)[3γ(2θ¯∆u−∆T )− 2]2
9γ(9γθ¯∆u− 4)2
, (21)
pi∗h =
(9γθ¯∆u− 2)[3γ(θ¯∆u+∆T )− 2]2
9γ(9γθ¯∆u− 4)2
. (22)
5Second order conditions require that γ > 2
9θ¯∆u
.
6Condition 20 implies that second order conditions are satisfied.
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4 Accessibility investments
Let us now discuss more in detail the accessibility investment behavior of firms.
4.1 Profits and investments: high quality vs low quality
firm
We begin by comparing profits and investments of the high quality and low
quality firm. A first result is that that the high-quality firm can earn lower
profits than the low-quality one. Indeed comparison of (21) and (22) reveals
that pi∗h ⋚ pi
∗
l ⇔ ∆T R
θ¯∆u
2 . The expression
θ¯∆u
2 is the hedonic willingness
to pay for the quality premium (∆u) of the median consumer ( θ¯2 ). When the
(relative) accessibility for firm l is higher than the willingness to pay for the
quality premium, the h-firm earns lower profits than its rival.
Relative accessibility investment is defined as
r∗h − r
∗
l ≡ ∆r
∗ =
2θ¯∆u− 4∆T
9γθ¯∆u − 4
(23)
Let us consider the role of the relative ex-ante accessibility on the relative in-
vestments. It is easy to ascertain that the sign of ∂∆r
∗
∂∆T is negative. An increase
of the relative cost of serving consumers for firm h reduces the relative invest-
ment of firm h. Let us now expand on the relative size of the optimal investment
themselves. The sign of the difference ∆r∗ depends upon the sign of its numer-
ator, which in turn depends the relative sizes of the willingness to pay of the
median consumer for the quality premium and the relative gross accessibility
for firm l. The high-quality firm invests more than the low-quality if and only
if the relative gross accessibility for firm l is smaller than the willingness to
pay for the quality premium of the median consumer. This is exactly the same
condition as for profit comparison. When ∆T < θ¯∆u2 , the high-quality firm
fully exploits its quality advantage and invests more resources in transport cost
reduction than its rival, and at equilibrium this results in higher profits for the
h-firm than for the l-one. The contrary holds when ∆T is higher than θ¯∆u2 . In
this case the high-quality firm suffers an accessibility disadvantage which lowers
its investment in transport cost reduction and makes it earn lower profits than
its low-quality rival.7
7The result that in models of vertical differentiation the high-quality producer may end up
to earn lower profits than its low-quality competitor is not novel to the literature (see, e.g.
Bacchiega (2007)).
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All these observations are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) When ∆T < θ¯∆u2 , pi
∗
h > pi
∗
l and the high-quality firm invests
more in transport cost abatement than the low-quality one; (ii) when ∆T > θ¯∆u2 ,
pi∗h < pi
∗
l and the high quality firm invests less than the low-quality one.
4.2 Optimal accessibility investment levels
Let us start by briefly considering the impact of transport costs on first-stage
prices (8) and (9), which will prove to be useful in the following discussion.
Simple calculations show that
∂pˆh
∂Th
=
∂pˆl
∂Tl
= −
1
3
, (24)
∂pˆh
∂Tl
=
∂pˆl
∂Th
=
1
3
. (25)
The higher the cost borne to buy from a firm in a region, the lower has to be
the price charged by the firm operating there. Symmetrically, the higher the
cost borne to buy from the rival firm, the higher can be the price charged by
the firm. As expected, higher transport costs increase the overall price paid by
consumers and therefore lessen competition.
We now move to the structure of optimal investment levels. First, we analyze
the role of firm’s quality level on the investment effort exerted. By inspecting
(14) and (15), it can easily ascertain that
∂r∗h
∂uh
=
∂r∗l
∂ul
=
2θ¯(9γ∆T − 2)
(9γθ¯∆u − 4)2
, (26)
∂r∗h
∂ul
=
∂r∗l
∂uh
=
2θ¯(2− 9γ∆T )
(9γθ¯∆u − 4)2
. (27)
A preliminary remark is necessary, which clarifies the discussion below. All
else equal, an exogenous increase in uh widens the quality gap between firms,
thus differentiating products more and relaxing competition. By contrast, an
increase in ul makes products more homogeneous, thus increasing competition.
Consider the situation ∆T < 29γ ≡ ∆¯T . In this case an increase in the quality
of the own variant reduces the optimal investments in accessibility, while an
increase in the rival’s quality has the opposite effect. If the ex-ante difference
in transport costs is relatively small, the quality difference and prices play a
major role in determining firms’ demands and profits. Furthermore, since pro-
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duction costs are nil for both firms, the high-quality producer is in a better
competitive position than its low-quality rival. Keeping this in mind, consider
the high-quality producer. An increase in uh -all else equal- increases the price
this firm can charge on the consumers, which translates into a higher mark-up
on every unit sold. As a consequence, this firm may increase its profits by saving
on accessibility investments (recall that ∆¯T is “small”), thus reducing r∗h. An
increase in ul reduces the firm’s price (and thus the mark-up), and pushes the
high-quality firm to look for a competitive advantage by enhancing its accessi-
bility. Move now to the low-quality producer, and remember that since ∆T is
“small” this firm is relatively disadvantaged. An increase in ul harshens compe-
tition and reduces the firm’s mark-up. The firm compensates this decrease by
improving its accessibility. By contrast, when uh increases, the margin for the
low-quality producer widens, resulting in savings in accessibility investments.
We consider now the case in which ∆T > ∆¯T : transport costs are relatively
asymmetric and harm firm h more than firm l. In this case an increase in the
quality level of the own variant increases own accessibility investments while
an increase in the rival’s one reduces them. Again consider the high-quality
firm first. This firm is relatively disadvantaged by transport costs. An increase
in uh increases the mark up for the firm, and consequently the incentives to
improve its accessibility to take full advantage of higher quality. By contrast,
an increase in ul makes competition fiercer, and leads the h-firm to reduce
investments. Consider the low-quality firm now. If ul increases, competition is
tougher and the low-quality firm preserves its relative accessibility advantage
by increasing investments. Finally, if uh increases, competition is looser and the
l-firm can save on investment costs without losing profits. We summarize the
foregoing remarks in the following.
Proposition 2 Let ∆¯T = 29γ
(i) when ∆T < ∆¯T , an increase in one firm’s quality level decreases its own
investment and increases its rival’s one;
(ii) when ∆T > ∆¯T , an increase in one firm’s quality level increases its own
investment and decreases its rival’s one.
4.3 Investments and ex-ante accessibility
A natural question is about the effect of an increase in the ex-ante accessibility
cost (Ti with i = h, l) on the optimal investment levels. Computations show
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that:
∂r∗h
∂Th
=
∂r∗l
∂Tl
= −
2
9γθ¯∆u − 4
< 0; (28)
∂r∗h
∂Tl
=
∂r∗l
∂Th
=
2
9γθ¯∆u − 4
> 0. (29)
Assumption (20) together with ∆T ≥ 0 determine the sign of (28) and (29).
Each firm (i) decreases its optimal investment in accessibility when own gross
accessibility worsens while (ii) a deterioration in the rival’s accessibility increases
the investment of the firm. The intuition for these results relies on the interac-
tion of demand and strategic effects. An increase in own transport costs lowers
profits due to both a reduction in consumers served (which now prefer the other
firm) and a decrease in the price charged. These effects reduce (expected) prof-
its and thus the incentives for transport cost abatement. Symmetrically, if the
rival’s transport cost increases, more consumers choose the firm’s good and the
price competition is milder. Both effects increase profits and increase incentives
for reduction in transport costs. The following proposition summarizes this
discussion.
Proposition 3 (i) An increase in the ex-ante transport costs for one firm’s
own region reduces the firm’s optimal investments in accessibility improvement;
(ii) an increase in the ex-ante transport costs for the rival’s region increases the
firm’s optimal investments in accessibility improvement.
5 Welfare
Welfare is usually defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits mi-
nus transport costs in the location in which policy authorities rule. Since in
our model firms and consumers are located in different regions, the definition of
the territorial unit of policy intervention defines the form of the welfare func-
tion itself. If we consider the high- and low-quality regions as independent
from one another then welfare in each region coincides with firms’ profits, and
regional policynakers simply compete in attracting customers. Thus the welfare-
maximizing accessibility investments coincide to those described in the previous
sections, and all the analysis carries through unchanged. Let us now cope with
the situation where regions belong to the same policy unit. In particular, in
what follows we tackle the two cases of (i) one single policy authority for re-
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gions h and l, which hence does not take into account the consumers’ surplus,
and (ii) the case in which consumers and firms belong to a single policy unit.
We denote case (i) “Aggregate Profit Maximization” (PM ) and case (ii) “Social
welfare maximization”(SWM ).
In case (i) (aggregate profit maximization), the two regions h and l are
subject to the authority of a single policymaker. The policymaker aims at max-
imizing the total welfare of the two regions. As discussed above, this translates
into the following problem.
max
rh,rl
pˆih(.) + pˆil(.) −Rh(.)−Rl(.), (30)
where pˆii, with i = h, l are as in (10) and (11). In the Appendix we prove that
the accessibility investments that maximize total profits are
rAPMh =
2θ¯∆u− 4∆T
9γθ¯∆u − 9
, rAPMl = 0. (31)
The policy prescription suggested by this result is to concentrate all the ac-
cessibility investment on the high-quality region. This result is counterintuitive
at a first sight only. Indeed the purpose of this policy guideline is to maximize
the number of consumers selecting the high-quality firm. The high-quality firm
charges a higher price on consumers and thus extracts a higher surplus from
them. Therefore improving the accessibility for region h relative to region l
results in an increase in the surplus extracted because of the higher number of
consumers selecting the high-quality firm.
Let us now move to the case (ii) in which both the firms and the set of
consumers reside in the same administrative region. In this case the policy
authority faces a different problem with regard to the previous one, because
now policymakers should take into account the consumer surplus as well. In
this case the relevant welfare function is of the more usual form
WSWM (rh, rl) =
1
θ¯
[
∫ θˆh,l
0
(U0 + θul − tl)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θˆh,l
(U0 + θuh − th)dθ]
−Rh(.)−Rl(.), (32)
where θˆh,l ≡ θh,l(pˆh(.), pˆl(.)). As in the previous case, the policymaker’s problem
is
max
rh,rl
WSWM (rh, rl) (33)
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In the Appendix we show that the unique solution to problem (33) is
rSWM =
7θ¯∆u− 5∆T
9γθ¯∆u − 5
, rSWMl = 0. (34)
All investments should be made in the enhancement of the high-quality firm’s
accessibility, as in the previous case. The surplus-extraction intuition previously
provided is still valid here, yet it should be integrated as follows. By abating the
transport cost for the high-quality region, the number of consumers selecting
the high-quality firm grows, which, in turn, further increases the overall surplus
generated. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Social welfare maximization requires to foster accessibility in-
vestments of the high-quality firm’s region only.
The prescriptions contained in proposition 4 have some interesting conse-
quences. In particular they entail that the accessibility investments under
duopolistic competition to region l are always larger than those socially op-
timal, and thus define a clearcut guideline of policy intervention towards this
firm.
6 Extension: endogenous qualities
In this section we extend our model to allow firms to endogenously choose the
quality level of the good they supply. This allows us to investigate the influence
of the level of ex-ante transport costs on the quality level selected by firms.
In order to introduce the choice of quality in our model, we follow Moor-
thy (1988) by assuming that the quality level of a good directly influences its
marginal production cost. In particular, let the marginal production cost of
good i ∈ {h, l} be quadratic in the quality level:
C′i(ui) = u
2
i .
Profits (see eq. 7) are thus re-defined as follows (no fixed costs are borne by
firms)
Π(ph, pl, uh, ul) = Di(.)(pi − u
2
i ). (35)
Firms play now a three-stage game. At the first stage they select the investment
in accessibility improvement, at the second stage they select the quality level of
13
their product, and finally they set price. Moves at each stage are simultaneous.
The solution concept is that of subgame perfection.
The third stage is solved through standard maximization techniques, yielding
the following prices
pˆh =
1
6
[2u2h + u
2
l + 4θ¯(∆u)− 2(th − tl)], (36)
pˆl =
1
6
[u2h + 2u
2
l + 2θ¯(∆u) + 2(th − tl)]. (37)
Notice that the first three terms inside the square brackets of (36) and (37)
are positive, while the last one can be positive or negative, depending on the
relative size of th and tl, the ex-post accessibility costs. In the Appendix we
prove that th > tl only is compatible with the existence of optimal strategies at
the quality stage.8 As usual, (36) and (37) can be plugged back into (35), for
i = h, l. The obtained equations are then used to derive the optimal values for
qualities. In the Appendix we show that the optimal qualities selected at this
stage are unique and they are
uˆh =
2
3
(th − tl)
θ¯
+
5
4
θ¯; (38)
uˆl =
2
3
(th − tl)
θ¯
−
1
4
θ¯. (39)
To complete the characterization of the SPNE of the game we need now
to determine the optimal investments in accessibility by firms, after having
substituted uˆh and uˆl back into (35).We stick to the previous section’s modeling
strategy and we assume that the accessibility improving technology displays
decreasing returns to scale. A reduction in the ex-ante accessibility cost Ti by
an amount ri requires an investment equal to γr
2
i /2, i = h, l. We do not report
the analytical details leading to the solution of the first stage, but only the main
outcomes.
The optimal investment levels at the first stage are given by:
r∗h =
2
3γ
−
16∆T
27γθ¯2 − 32
, (40)
r∗l =
2
3γ
+
16∆T
27γθ¯2 − 32
. (41)
8Since ti = Ti − ri, this condition involves the values of optimal investments, which are
determined at the first stage of the game. In the following we prove that the condition holds
at equilibrium.
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By plugging (40) and (41) back into eqs. (36) to (39) we obtain the equilib-
rium prices and qualities, which we report hereafter:
p∗h =
θ¯2
32
{
49 +
144γ∆T [9γ(4∆T + 3θ¯2)]
(32− 27γθ¯2)2
}
, (42)
p∗l =
θ¯2
32
{
25 +
432γ∆T [3γ(4∆T + 9θ¯2)]
(32− 27γθ¯2)2
}
; (43)
and
u∗h =
18γ∆T θ¯
27γθ¯2 − 32
+
5
4
θ¯, (44)
u∗l =
18γ∆T θ¯
27γθ¯2 − 32
−
1
4
θ¯. (45)
We assume that (45) and (44) are positive, which requires that γ > max{ 32
27θ¯2
, 32
72∆T−27θ¯2
}.
Together with our initial hypothesis ∆T ≥ 0, this guarantees the positivity of
equilibrium prices (42) and (43), and the fulfilling of second order conditions at
the accessibility investment stage.9 A first result is summarized in the following
Proposition 5 The high-quality firm invests in accessibility improvement al-
ways less than the low-quality one.
The high-quality firm exploits the higher willingness to pay of consumers
for the good it sells, and thus is less keen on devoting resources in accessibility
improvement. Furthermore, an increase in the relative ex-ante accessibility for
region l (i.e. an increase in ∆T ) entails the same increase in the quality level
of the firms, but a reduction in the accessibility investment of firm h and an
increase in that of firm l. An increase in ∆T harms firm h by lowering its
accessibility. This firm reacts by increasing its quality level and reducing the
accessibility investment. By contrast, the low-quality firm is advantaged by an
increase in ∆T , and reacts to an improvement in its relative accessibility by
fostering its investments both in accessibility and quality. Finally, notice that
variations in ∆T do not affect the equilibrium level of product differentiation,
which is always equal to 32 θ¯.
To conclude this section we analyze the relative performance of firms, mea-
9A direct consequence of our assumption ∆T > 0 and the result that r∗
h
< r∗
l
is that the ex
post accessibility costs difference t∗
h
− t∗
l
≡ Th− t
∗
h
−Tl+ r
∗
l
> 0, which satisfies the condition
for the existence of optimal qualities at the second stage of the game.
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sured by their equilibrium profits, that are:
Π∗h =
3[8θ¯(3γ∆T + 4)− 27γθ¯3]2
8(27γθ¯2)2
; (46)
Π∗l =
3[8θ¯(3γ∆T − 4) + 27γθ¯3]2
8(27γθ¯2)2
. (47)
Direct comparison of (46) and (47) yields
Proposition 6 The low-quality firm earns higher profits than the high-quality
one.
This outcome can be explained by resorting to the results by Cremer and
Thisse (1991) on the relationship between models of vertical and horizontal dif-
ferentiation. Abstracting from the accessibility improvement stage, the present
model is isomorphic to an Hotelling (1929) model of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation with symmetric firms, quadratic transport costs and uniformly dis-
tributed consumer tastes. This type of model has a symmetric Nash Equilibrium
at which firms select maximum product differentiation and earn equal profits
which exists, therefore, in the corresponding vertical differentiation model. The
accessibility improvement stage breaks the symmetry of the model (as long as
∆T 6= 0). In particular the assumption ∆T ≥ 0 charges an initial burden on
firm h which results in lower equilibrium profits for this firm. It is easily ascer-
tained that when there is no asymmetry in the ex-ante transport costs (∆T = 0)
the symmetry of Nash Equilibrium of the model is restored.
This extension highlights the importance of proximity to consumers to de-
termine the profitability of a firm. Being the producer of high-quality is neither
necessary nor sufficient to become the market leader in terms of profits. Indeed
the low-quality firm invests more than the high-quality one and ends up with
earning higher profits than its higher-quality rival.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we model the competition between firms engaging in a strategic
investment in market accessibility. Firms are differentiated in terms of quality
and, before competing on prices, they invest in market accessibility enhance-
ment.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, high-quality firms can
earn lower equilibrium profits than the low-quality one. This happens when the
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market accessibility for the products of the low quality firm is higher than the
willingness to pay for the quality premium. Interestingly, this result parallels
the condition for investments: the firm investing more is the firm earning higher
profits. Second, optimal investments depend both on quality and ex-ante trans-
port costs. In particular, an increase in quality for high-quality firm increases
the investment only if the relative accessibility of the low-quality firm is high
enough. Symmetrically, an increase in the quality for low quality firm increases
the investment only if its own relative market accessibility is low. Moreover
the level of investment is positively affected by improved ex-ante accessibility
conditions. Third, the low quality firm has incentives toward transport cost
reduction that are unambiguously larger than those maximizing total profits or
social welfare. This suggests a clearcut intervention guideline for policymakers.
Last, the model is extended allowing firms to endogenously select the quality
level of the good they produce. In this case, the high quality firm invests in
accessibility improvement always less that the low-quality one, and this results
in lower profit.
A Welfare: calculus
A.1 Case (i): Aggregate Profit Maximization (APM )
The welfare function in this case is:
WAPM (rh, rl) = pˆih(.) + pˆil(.)−Rh(.)−Rl(.) =
=
1
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[4(rh − rl +∆T ) + 10θ¯∆u+
4(rh − rl −∆T )
2
θ¯∆u
− 9γ(r2h + r
2
l )] (48)
The government maximizes (48) with respect to rh and rl. To solve this problem
we use the first-order condition approach. The solution to the following system
gives the candidate maximizers.


∂WAP M (rh,rl)
∂rh
= 0
∂WAP M (rh,rl)
∂rl
= 0
(49)
The system (49) has three solutions; label them (rAPM1h , r
APM1
l ), (r
APM2
h , r
APM2
l )
and (rAPM3h , r
APM3
l ).
10 By substitution of (rAPM2h , r
APM2
l ) and (r
APM3
h , r
APM3
l )
10The expressions for the candidate maximizers are available upon request.
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into (48), we obtain that WAPM (rAPM2h , r
APM2
l ) = W
APM (rAPM3h , r
APM3
l ) =
0, while WAPM (rAPM1h , r
APM1
l ) 6= 0. Thus the set of candidate maximizers
of WAPM (.) reduces to the singleton (rAPM1h , r
APM1
l ). To complete the proof
of Proposition 3, we shall show that this candidate is indeed a maximum. To
this end, we evaluate the concavity of the welfare function. Define the Hessian
matrix of the maximization problem as
HW
AP M
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2WAP M (.)
∂r2
h
∂2WAP M (.)
∂rh∂rl
∂2WAP M (.)
∂rl∂rh
∂2WAP M (.)
∂r2
l
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (50)
Calculations show that ∂
2WAP M (.)
∂r2
h
> 0 and Det(HW
AP M
) < 0. We conclude
that (rAPM1h , r
APM1
l ) maximizes W
APM (.). The maximizers are given by:
rAPM1h =
4∆T − 2θ¯∆u
4− 9γθ¯∆u
, (51)
rAPM1l =0. (52)
To avoid cumbersome notation in the text we have suppressed the identifier 1
in the indexes.
A.2 Case (ii): Social Welfare Maximization (SWM)
The analysis in this case develops along the same lines as before, so it will only
be sketched. The first-order condition approach leads to three candidate max-
imizers. By analogy with the previous case, we label them (rSWM1h , r
SWM1
l ),
(rSWM2h , r
SWM2
l ) and (r
SWM3
h , r
SWM3
l ). It can be proved that the last two can-
didate make can be discarded. The analysis of the Hessian matrix associated to
this problem confirms that (rSWM1h , r
SWM1
l ) are indeed the desired maximizers.
Their value is as follows (identifiers have been suppressed, the expressions for
the other candidate are available upon request).
rSWMh =
5∆T − 7θ¯∆u
5− 9γθ¯∆u
, rSWMl = 0. (53)
B Equilibrium qualities
In this Appendix we derive the optimal qualities at the second stage of the
game. We are interested in pure-strategy equilibria with uh > ul.
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By plugging (36) and (37) back into (35) for i = h, l, we obtain the following
firm profits
Πˆh(.) =
[2(th − tl) + ∆u(uh + ul − 4θ¯)]
2
36θ¯∆u
, (54)
Πˆl(.) =
[2(th − tl) + ∆u(uh + ul + 2θ¯)]
2
36θ¯∆u
; (55)
where ∆u ≡ uh − ul. The candidate equilibria at the quality stage are the
solutions of the following system


∂Πh(.)
∂uh
= 0
∂Πl(.)
∂ul
= 0
. (56)
Five pairs (uh, ul) satisfy (56), namely
(
θ¯
2
,
1
2
(
√
8(th − tl) + 9θ¯2 − 2θ¯)
)
≡ (u1h, u
1
l );(
2
3
(th − tl)
θ¯
+
5
4
θ¯,
2
3
(th − tl)
θ¯
−
1
4
θ¯
)
≡ (u2h, u
2
l );
(
2θ¯ −
1
2
√
−8(th − tl) + 9θ¯2,
θ¯
2
)
≡ (u3h, u
3
l );(
θ¯
2
,−θ¯ −
1
2
√
8(th − tl) + 9θ¯2
)
≡ (u4h, u
4
l ).
(
2θ¯ +
1
2
√
−8(th − tl) + 9θ¯2,
θ¯
2
)
≡ (u5h, u
5
l );
Two cases have to be considered depending on the sign of th − tl.
(i) Consider the case th − tl < 0. Candidates (u
1
h, u
1
l ) and (u
3
h, u
3
l ) are
excluded because uh < ul. Candidate (u
2
h, u
2
l ) is excluded because u
2
l < 0. The
fourth candidate is disregarded because ul is either not real or negative. At the
last candidate firm-h’s profits are equal to zero, and it can be easily proved that
there exists a profitable deviation for this firm at the quality stage. This allows
us to conclude that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium at the quality-choice
stage with th < tl.
(ii) Move to case th > tl. The pair (u
4
h, u
4
l ) can again be excluded because
it involves a negative value for ul. Candidates (u
1
h, u
1
l ) and (u
5
h, u
5
l ) can be
disregarded because firm-h’s profits Πh(u
1
h, u
1
l , .) ≤ 0, ∀th > tl. It can be
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proven that this firm has a profitable deviation in one of the stages of the game.
Candidate (u3h, u
3
l ) is excluded because it fails to fulfill (local) second order
conditions. The only candidate left under scrutiny is (u2h, u
2
l ). This candidate
satisfies (local) second order conditions and it can be checked that there are no
profitable deviations in the whole strategy space for the two firms. This allows
us to conclude that the only qualities that can be a part of a SPNE of the game
are
(u2h, u
2
l ) ≡ (uˆh, uˆl)
with th > tl.
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